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Patent holders whose patents are essential to a standard are usually required to
license their patents under fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory (FRAND) terms.
This requirement is often interpreted as a price cap such that royalties for the patents
do not exceed their pre-standardisation incremental values. Using a theoretical model
of innovators with interacting technologies, I consider the problem of choosing the
incentive scheme to induce welfare-maximising research investments under the con-
dition that it only uses the values created by the innovators, and analyse the prevalent
interpretation of FRAND compared to the optimal scheme. It shows that in some
cases, this incremental value rule does not lead to the efficient level of innovation
investment.
Keywords: standardisation, standard-essential patents, FRAND, innovation incentives
JEL classification: L15, O31, O34, O38
1 Introduction
Technical standards, such as Wi-Fi or LTE for wireless communication, often involve
many inventions that are protected by patents. A patented invention may be integral
to the standard such that an implementer of the standard, for example a mobile phone
manufacturer, must use it to produce a standard-compliant product. Such a patent becomes
a standard-essential patent (SEP), and the manufacturer needs to obtain a licence for the
∗ Tilburg University, Department of Economics, TILEC. Email: c.wipusanawan@tilburguniversity.edu. I am
grateful to my supervisors Florian Schuett and Bert Willems for their tremendous guidance and support.
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SEP to market their products. The number of patents involved can be huge for a complex
standard. For example, the LTE standard involves thousands of different patents (Baron
and Pohlmann 2018).
In general, a patent holder is allowed to exclude others from using the invention. This can
be detrimental to a standard, which is meant to be widely adopted. Many standard-setting
organisations (SSOs) therefore require that their members commit to license their SEPs
under fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory (FRAND) terms.1 One problem that FRAND
licensing commitment purports to alleviate is the patent hold-up problem. The problem can
be summarised as follows. Before a standard is codified, there may be multiple technologies
that can provide similar functionalities (that is, they are substitutes), and the bargaining
power of a particular patent holder at this stage is restricted by competition. However,
once one particular technology is chosen as the standard, other technologies are no longer
viable alternatives for standard implementers. Without restrictions on licensing, the SEP
holder can capture the value of being included in the standard that is higher than its prior
underlying value among competitors (Shapiro 2001; Farrell et al. 2007).
Although FRAND licensing commitment is a common feature of SSO policies, what it
entails has not always been clear. Determination of ‘reasonable’ royalties for SEPs has been
a major contention in several legal disputes. Scholars have proposed an interpretation that
reasonable royalties should reflect the royalties in a hypothetical competition before the
standard is set, which is the incremental value over the next best alternative (Swanson and
Baumol 2005; Farrell et al. 2007).2 In the United States, this incremental value interpretation
has been endorsed by the Federal Trade Commission (2011) and accepted by courts in SEP-
related cases.3
Given that patents are meant to incentivise investment in innovation, a policy that
essentially caps the royalties for SEP holders is met with concerns that it excessively
restricts the incentives for innovators (see e.g. Geradin and Rato 2007; Sidak 2013; Siebrasse
and Cotter 2017). From the perspective of economic welfare, the pertinent question is what
1 Lemley (2002) studies the policies of forty-three SSOs in telecommunications and computer networking
industries and finds that the majority of them requires FRAND licensing.
2 In the literature, this hypothetical competition has often been called ex ante competition, since it reflects
the situation before the standard is decided. I do not use this terminology in the paper to avoid confusion,
since such competition occurs after the innovation process, which is the focus of this paper.
3 For example, the US Federal Circuit noted in Ericsson v D-Link (773 F.3d 1201 (2014)) that ‘the patentee’s
royalty must be premised on the value of the patented feature, not any value added by the standard’s
adoption of the patented technology … to ensure that the royalty award is based on the incremental
value that the patented invention adds to the product, not any value added by the standardization of that
technology’.
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the optimal innovation incentives should look like and whether the prevalent interpretation
of reasonable royalties is optimal.
In this paper, I study the incentive to innovate when there are multiple technologies
and the (incremental) value of each depends on which other technologies are available,
which is usually the case in standardisation. Technologies from different innovators can be
competing with each other, with the extreme case being that they are perfect substitutes,
or they may complement each other such that the whole is greater than the sum of its
parts. Using this framework, I consider the problem of choosing the incentive scheme to
induce research investments that maximise the expected value of the technology bundle
net of the research costs. The incentive scheme is restricted by a budget constraint that
the revenues given to innovators come from the values that they jointly create; in other
words, external subsidies are not allowed. This problem mirrors the budget-balanced
multi-product pricing problem that yields the Ramsey pricing solution. Then, I define
the competitive benchmark that represents the prevailing interpretation of FRAND, and
evaluate the benchmark compared to the optimal incentive scheme.
The key result of this paper is that competitive royalties are not necessarily optimal,
and economic welfare can sometimes be enhanced by allowing greater royalties than the
competitive level. This result relates to a conventional economic wisdom that investment
decisions are efficient if the marginal private incentive aligns with the marginal social
contribution.4 The competitive royalty that a patent holder can command, according to the
idea of hypothetical pre-standardisation competition, is restricted by the incremental value
of the technology over its best alternative. The same idea also holds true for a group of
patent holders; their combined competitive royalties are restricted by their total incremental
value over the best alternative standard that does not feature any of their inventions. If an
innovator is rewarded exactly the incremental value of their contribution, then the marginal
incentive aligns with the marginal social contribution. However, when multiple inventions
are complements, the sum of individual incremental values exceeds the joint incremental
value (Shapiro 2007). By imposing competitive royalties within a specific realised state of
innovation, it is possible that an inventor has a competing substitute that drives down its
competitive royalty (justifiably in isolation) in one realised state, but receives a competitive
royalty smaller than its incremental value in another state due to complementarities, since
not all inventors can simultaneously receive their individual incremental value. By allowing
4 Pigouvian taxes (or subsidies) for externalities are one of the best-known applications of this wisdom. In the
work that introduces this concept, Pigou (1920: 161) uses patent laws as an example of a tool for ‘bringing
marginal trade net product and marginal social net product more closely together’.
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supra-competitive royalties in the former state, the marginal incentive in expectation over
different states moves closer to the marginal social contribution when the incentives are
considered in expectation over multiple possible outcomes.
This paper contributes to the analysis of how innovation should be incentivised in the
standardisation context. Themodel adds a preceding stage to analyses of the standardisation
process that begin after the technologies have been invented. In particular, the modelling
approach for the value of technologies in a standard is similar to Lerner and Tirole (2015), and
the competitive benchmark in this paper is consistent with their definition of a competitive
equilibrium. The probabilistic innovation process used in this paper is also used by Layne-
Farrar, Llobet, and Padilla (2014), who show that competitive royalties are not sufficient
to attract innovating firms to participate in standardisation efforts when the choice of
participation is endogenous. Gilbert and Katz (2011) study a similar question of dividing
the value of multiple perfectly complementary technologies among inventors. Their paper
uses a dynamic model in which multiple inventors compete to discover each component
sequentially. In contrast to their work, my model does not feature a ‘winner-takes-all’ race
to discover a technology, but allows each invention to potentially have complementary as
well as substitute innovations.
More broadly, other papers study different aspects of innovation incentives under FRAND
licensing commitments. Ganglmair, Froeb, and Werden (2012) study the enforcement of
FRAND commitments and argue that damage remedies against SEP holders suboptimally
restrict innovation, while Dewatripont and Legros (2013) show that FRAND licensing
requirements may lead to firms claiming SEPs that are not really ‘essential’ to the standard.
The structure of innovation efforts in this paper can also be compared to the standard
problem of incentives for teams, in which multiple agents contribute to a common goal.
The model of multiple innovators contributing to the expected social welfare corresponds
to the team incentive model of Holmström (1982), with the key difference being that,
instead of contracting solely on the joint outcome, the principal can also contract upon
individual signals (i.e. research outcomes), even though actions of individual agents remain
non-contractible.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. To set the stage, Section 2 describes a
simplified example that highlights the intuition presented in this paper. Section 3 describes
the model set-up for the rest of the paper, while Section 4 explains the result that the
competitive benchmark is not necessarily optimal. Section 5 concludes with some caveats
on how the results from this model should be interpreted.
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2 A simple example
This section provides an intuitive example to the results in this paper, although the following
model is not strictly a special case of the model described in Section 3.
Example 1. Suppose there is a project that has a value 𝑣 > 0 if it is achieved. This project
can be achieved in two ways: (i) it has two complementary technologies, 1 and 2, which may
be invented by the corresponding firms 1 and 2, or, (ii) a free alternative, called technology 0,
is found.
Technology 0 is found at no cost with an exogenous probability 𝑞. For each firm 𝑖 ∈ {1, 2},
its attempt to invent technology 𝑖 succeeds with probability 𝑥𝑖 if it invests 𝑥𝑎𝑖 /𝑎, with 𝑎 > 2.
The firms choose the research efforts 𝑥1 and 𝑥2 simultaneously. After the efforts are
chosen, the outcomes of three probabilistic processes are realised. These processes are
independent. Figure 1 summarises the timing within this model, including the hypothetical
stages for a welfare-maximising principal and the competitive benchmark that are explained
below.
Given this set-up, the expected social surplus given the research efforts 𝑥1 and 𝑥2 is







Assume that the values of 𝑞 and 𝑣 are such that the research efforts that maximise the
expected surplus are interior in [0, 1]2. From the first-order conditions, the (unconstrained)
surplus-maximising research efforts are
𝑥1 = 𝑥2 = [(1 − 𝑞)𝑣]1/(𝑎−2).
Now, consider a principal who cannot directly choose or contract on the research efforts,
but can design a revenue scheme for firms based on the realised outcomes. The rule is
announced before the firms make their decisions. For simplicity, suppose that the principal
must choose a scheme of the following form: each firm 𝑖 receives 𝜌 if technologies 1 and 2
are invented while technology 0 is not, and each firm 𝑖 receives 𝜌 if technologies 0, 1, and 2,











Firms set price for
an implementer.
Principal’s problem Competitive benchmark
Figure 1: The timing of the model. The stages in the dashed boxes are only relevant to their respective cases.
anything.5 Under such a scheme, firm 𝑖’s expected profit is




and the non-zero symmetric Nash equilibrium of the investment game is
𝑥1 = 𝑥2 = [𝑞𝜌 + (1 − 𝑞)𝜌]1/(𝑎−2). (2)
The principal chooses a revenue scheme of 𝜌 and 𝜌 to maximise the expected surplus (1),
given that the firms invest according to the equilibrium (2). In addition, the principal is
restricted by the constraints that the total revenues given to the firms must not exceed the
value 𝑣 in any state, that is, 𝜌, 𝜌 ≤ 𝑣/2. If 𝑞 ≥ 1/2, then setting 𝜌 = 𝑣/2 and 𝜌 = (𝑣/2)(1 −
𝑞)/𝑞 aligns the equilibrium research effort with the unconstrained surplus-maximising effort
[(1 − 𝑞)𝑣]1/(𝑎−2). On the other hand, if 𝑞 < 1/2, then the expected surplus is maximised,
given the constraints, at 𝜌 = 𝜌 = 𝑣/2, which induces the research effort 𝑣/2 that is smaller
than the unconstrained optimal efforts.
The competitive benchmark is defined in the following way. Suppose the revenues that
firms receive are not set a priori by a principal, but are instead determined in a Bertrand-like
process after the invention outcomes are realised. Firms 1 and 2 simultaneously propose a
price for their technology to an implementer, who then decides whether to pay the proposed
prices for the firms’ technologies. The competitive benchmark is the price in the symmetric
equilibrium in which the implementer is willing to buy from the firms. (This requirement
rules out coordination failures.) The symmetric equilibrium price for each of technologies 1
and 2 is 𝑣/2 if both of them are successfully invented and technology 0 is not found (i.e.
𝜌 = 𝑣/2). In any other outcomes, the price for technologies 1 and 2, if they exist, must be
zero (including 𝜌 = 0). Recall that in the optimal scheme discussed above, firms are given
5 The imposed structure rules out asymmetric transfers and transfers when only one firm succeeds. Allowing
such transfers does not change the main intuition in this example that the optimal scheme prescribes
greater transfers than the competitive benchmark.
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positive revenues even when technology 0 is found (𝜌 > 0) in contrast to the zero revenue
prescribed by the competitive benchmark. This example then shows that the competitive
benchmark can still be improved upon.
To understand the intuition, consider the outcome in which the firms’ technologies are
invented but technology 0 is not. The incremental contribution that each firm brings to
the table with its technology is the full value 𝑣, since the project is worthless without it.
However, with the budget constraint of 𝑣, the principal cannot give the full value to both
firms, and the best thing under the constraint is to give 𝑣/2 to the firms if they both succeed.
If technology 0 is also found, then the firms’ technologies do not add any value, and in
isolation it makes sense that the firms cannot command a positive revenue in this case.
However, by allowing a positive revenue to firms in this outcome, the expected revenue of
a firm given their incremental contribution ‘offsets’ what the principal cannot give in the
other outcome.
In this example, the probability 𝑞 that the free substitute exists is completely exogenous.
The effect illustrated by this example can also be shownwhen all technologies are potentially
invented by self-interested firms, which is the case I consider in the following sections.
3 Model
Consider the following stylised model of innovation, in which multiple technologies can be
invented. Let 𝑁 = {1, … , 𝑛} denote the set of risk-neutral firms; each firm 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁 is endowed
with one idea for a technology. Firm 𝑖’s attempt to invent its technology succeeds with
probability 𝑥𝑖 if it invests 𝑐(𝑥𝑖), where 𝑐 is an increasing and convex function with 𝑐(0) = 0,
𝑐′(0) = 0, and lim𝑥𝑖→1 = ∞. The research processes of all firms are simultaneous and
independent. Let 𝑥 be the vector of research efforts (𝑥1, … , 𝑥𝑛).
As each technology may be independently invented, there are 2𝑛 possible states of the
world. Each state is characterised by the set of available technologies. Therefore, I will also
refer to the state of the world in which the set of successfully invented technologies is 𝑆 as
state 𝑆. The set of all possible states is the power set of 𝑁, denoted 𝒫 (𝑁).
If we have a set 𝑆 of available technologies, then the technologies jointly create a value
of 𝑣(𝑆). Assume that 𝑣 is normalised such that 𝑣(∅) = 0 and 𝑣 is monotonic, that is, for any
sets 𝑆 and 𝑇, we have 𝑣(𝑆) ≤ 𝑣(𝑇 ) if 𝑆 ⊆ 𝑇.6 Let ̄𝑣(𝑥) be the expected value of 𝑣(𝑆) given the
6 It is conceivable that including more technologies into a standard may reduce the value of the standard,
meaning that the value function of the standard is not monotonic (see Lerner and Tirole 2015). Since
the standard selection process is not modelled in this paper, the monotonicity of 𝑣(𝑆) can be justified by
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research efforts 𝑥, that is
̄𝑣(𝑥) = ∑
𝑆∈𝒫 (𝑁 )
Pr (𝑆 | 𝑥) 𝑣(𝑆),
where







is the probability that state 𝑆 is realised given the research efforts 𝑥. The expected social
surplus 𝑤(𝑥) can then be written as
𝑤(𝑥) = ̄𝑣(𝑥) −∑
𝑖∈𝑁
𝑐(𝑥𝑖).
As the ‘first-best’ benchmark, let 𝑥∗ be the research efforts that maximise 𝑤(𝑥). For
the rest of this paper, I assume that 𝑥∗ is the unique local and global maximum and it is
interior in [0, 1]𝑛. In most cases, it is plausible that research investment does not have an
identifiable upper bound and its nature resembles more closely the interior case. With










Pr (𝑆 | 𝑥−𝑖) [𝑣(𝑆) − 𝑣(𝑆 ⧵ {𝑖})]
and Pr (𝑆 | 𝑥−𝑖) is the probability that state 𝑆 is realised given that technology 𝑖 exists,






(1 − 𝑥𝑘)) . (4)
The difference 𝑣(𝑆) − 𝑣(𝑆 ⧵ {𝑖}) is the incremental contribution of technology 𝑖 in state 𝑆
and 𝜕 ̄𝑣(𝑥)/𝜕𝑥𝑖 is the expected incremental contribution.
Throughout this paper, the research efforts 𝑥 are assumed to be non-contractible, but it
is possible to specify how much each firm is paid in a particular state of the world. Let 𝑟𝑖(𝑆)
denote the revenue that firm 𝑖 receives in state 𝑆. A full schedule of revenues for all 𝑖 and 𝑆
is referred to as a revenue scheme. This revenue scheme may represent several things: it
may be a commonly known pre-determined rule (for example, an established law or SSO
policy on what constitutes FRAND terms), or it may be the result of backward induction
interpreting 𝑣(𝑆) as the value of the best standard that can be chosen in state 𝑆.
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from a licensing game that follows.
The firms’ research can then be defined as a strategic game of 𝑛 players, in which each
player 𝑖 chooses its research effort 𝑥𝑖 to maximise their expected profit
∑
𝑆∈𝒫 (𝑁 )
Pr (𝑆 | 𝑥) 𝑟𝑖(𝑆) − 𝑐(𝑥𝑖).
Assume that if the game has multiple Nash equilibria, the equilibrium that produces the
highest welfare 𝑤(𝑥) is chosen. With 𝑟𝑖(𝑆) ≥ 0 and the assumptions on 𝑐, the investment
equilibrium ?̂? satisfies the first-order condition
∑
𝑆∈𝒫 (𝑁 )
Pr (𝑆 | ?̂?−𝑖) [𝑟𝑖(𝑆) − 𝑟𝑖(𝑆 ⧵ {𝑖})] = 𝑐′(?̂?𝑖) for all 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁
with Pr (𝑆 | ?̂?−𝑖) defined by (4). This condition shows that any revenue schemes that feature
the same value of the difference 𝑟𝑖(𝑆) − 𝑟𝑖(𝑆 ⧵ {𝑖}) for all 𝑖 and 𝑆 induce identical equilibrium
research efforts. For the rest of the paper, I will restrict attention to revenue schemes
that only pay the firms when they succeed, that is, 𝑟𝑖(𝑆) = 0 if 𝑖 ∉ 𝑆. If the revenue 𝑟𝑖(𝑆)
equals the incremental value 𝑣(𝑆) − 𝑣(𝑆 ⧵ {𝑖}), then the equilibrium efforts coincide with
the first-best efforts (3).
To simplify the exposition further, let ̄𝑟𝑖 denote the expected revenue that firm 𝑖 receives
if its research succeeds, that is, for given research efforts 𝑥,
̄𝑟𝑖 = ∑
𝑆∈𝒫 (𝑁 )
Pr (𝑆 | 𝑥−𝑖) 𝑟𝑖(𝑆), (5)
and let ̄𝑟 denote the vector ( ̄𝑟1, … , ̄𝑟𝑛).7 Firm 𝑖’s expected profit can then be written as
𝑥𝑖 ̄𝑟𝑖 − 𝑐(𝑥𝑖) and the Nash equilibrium of the investment game can be defined as research
efforts ?̂? that satisfy
̄𝑟𝑖 = 𝑐′(?̂?𝑖) for all 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁 . (6)
The effort ?̂?𝑖 that satisfies (6) is unique for each ̄𝑟𝑖 and increasing in ̄𝑟𝑖.
Consider a hypothetical principal who sets a revenue scheme to maximise the expected
social surplus 𝑤(𝑥), given that firms invest according to the investment equilibrium. In
Section 4.1, I consider a simpler problem in which the principal chooses an expected revenue
vector ̄𝑟 such that, with the equilibrium efforts ?̂? defined by (6), the total expected revenues
7 This formulation of ̄𝑟𝑖 that sums over 𝑆 ∈ 𝒫 (𝑁 ) is possible given that 𝑟𝑖(𝑆) = 0 for 𝑖 ∉ 𝑆.
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given to all firms do not exceed the expected value:
∑
𝑖∈𝑁
?̂?𝑖 ̄𝑟𝑖 ≤ ̄𝑣(?̂?). (7)
This is a standard contracting problem with one budget constraint.8 The outcome of
this constrained optimisation problem serves as the upper boundary of the second-best
benchmark. After that, I will define a competitive benchmark within this framework, and
evaluate its performance in comparison to the second-best outcome.
The constraint (7) is formulated in expected terms and does not restrict the revenues
given to innovators in a particular state. In Section 4.3, I consider the problem in which the
total revenues given to the firms must not exceed the value in each state, that is,
∑
𝑖∈𝑆
𝑟𝑖(𝑆) ≤ 𝑣(𝑆) for all 𝑆 ∈ 𝒫 (𝑁 ). (8)
The competitive benchmark is again compared to the second-best outcome of this con-
strained optimisation problem.
4 Analysis
4.1 Optimal revenue scheme under the constraint in expected terms
Consider the problem of choosing the vector of expected revenues ̄𝑟 to maximise the
expected social surplus 𝑤(𝑥), given the equilibrium investment effort (6) and the budget
constraint (7). Proposition 1 below describes a condition for the solution of this constrained
maximisation problem.
Proposition 1. Under an aggregate budget constraint, the optimal expected revenue scheme
satisfies





for all 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁 (9)





8 The structure in this model is similar to that of Holmström (1982). His model can be characterised as follows:
given a vector of agents’ actions 𝑥, a joint value of 𝑤(𝑥) is created. A principal specifies a sharing rule 𝑠𝑖(𝑤)
such that ∑𝑖∈𝑁 𝑠𝑖(𝑤) ≤ 𝑤 for all 𝑤. Agent 𝑖’s pay-off given the action profile 𝑥 is 𝑠𝑖(𝑤(𝑥)) − 𝑐(𝑥𝑖). Comparing
the constraints with 𝑠𝑖(𝑤(𝑥)) and 𝑥𝑖 ̄𝑟𝑖, 𝑠𝑖(𝑤(𝑥)) is not necessarily linear in 𝑥, while 𝑥𝑖 ̄𝑟𝑖 is.
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Proof. For a given value of 𝑥𝑖, the revenue ̄𝑟𝑖 is uniquely defined in the investment equi-












− 𝑐′(𝑥𝑖) + 𝜆 (
𝜕 ̄𝑣(𝑥)
𝜕 𝑥𝑖
− 𝑐′(𝑥𝑖) − 𝑥𝑖𝑐″(𝑥𝑖)) = 0 (10)
for all 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁, and the complementary slackness condition
𝜆 (∑
𝑖∈𝑁
𝑥𝑖𝑐′(𝑥𝑖) − ̄𝑣(𝑥)) = 0,
with 𝜆 ≥ 0 being the Lagrange multiplier for the budget constraint. If the first-best
efforts 𝑥∗ are not feasible under this budget constraint, then in the solution we have 𝜆 > 0
and 𝜕 ̄𝑣(𝑥)/𝜕𝑥𝑖 − 𝑐′(𝑥𝑖) > 0. Rearranging equation (10) yields









Letting 𝑚 = 𝜆/(1 + 𝜆) and 𝑐′(𝑥𝑖) = ̄𝑟𝑖 we arrive at equation (9).
If the first-best efforts defined by equation (3) are feasible, then 𝜕 ̄𝑣(𝑥)/𝜕𝑥𝑖 − 𝑐′(𝑥𝑖) = 0
and equation (9) holds with 𝑚 = 0.
The result from this maximisation problem is analogous to the Ramsey pricing formula,
which in the simplest case is usually presented with a monopolist who supplies 𝑛 inde-
pendent goods (Baumol and Bradford 1970). In such a case, the Ramsey pricing formula
for good 𝑖, determining the deviation from the first-best marginal-cost pricing, is given
by (𝑝𝑖 − 𝑚𝑐𝑖)/𝑝𝑖 = 𝜇/𝜀𝑖, where 𝑝𝑖 denotes good 𝑖’s price, 𝑚𝑐𝑖 its marginal cost, 𝜀𝑖 its price
elasticity of demand, and 𝜇 a constant that is identical for all 𝑖. Equation (9) is the flip
side of this formula with a monopsonist and 𝑛 suppliers of research efforts. For all firms,
the deviation of their marginal revenues ̄𝑟𝑖 from their marginal contributions 𝜕 ̄𝑣(𝑥)/𝜕𝑥𝑖 is
inversely proportional to the ‘elasticity’ of effort, given by 𝑒𝑖 in equation (9). The elasticity 𝑒𝑖




I will now define the competitive benchmark within this framework. Suppose that instead
of a principal’s decision, the firms engage in the following Bertrand-like process with
an implementer after the invention stage is resolved and state 𝑆 is realised. Each firm
with a successful invention (that is, each 𝑖 ∈ 𝑆) simultaneously proposes a price 𝑟𝑖(𝑆) to
a representative implementer, who can choose from which firms to buy, if at all. The




where 𝐵 ∈ 𝒫 (𝑆) is the implementer’s chosen set of technologies.
A competitive benchmark for state 𝑆 is defined as a price vector of 𝑟 𝑐𝑖 (𝑆) that is part of
a strategy profile in this pricing game in which the implementer buys from all firms in 𝑆.
This notion of competitive benchmark is consistent with the definition of Lerner and Tirole
(2015).9
The following lemma describes a necessary condition for the competitive benchmark,
especially in relation to the incremental value concept. It encapsulates the idea that, in
the hypothetical pre-standardisation competition, the price that a firm can demand is the
incremental value of its technology (Swanson and Baumol 2005). One point that has been
less explicitly emphasised in the discussion is that the incremental value rule must be
applied jointly for any group of technologies as well. This means the competitive price
may be strictly less than the individual incremental value 𝑣(𝑆) − 𝑣(𝑆 ⧵ {𝑖}).
Lemma 1. In a competitive benchmark for any state 𝑆, the firms’ prices 𝑟 𝑐𝑖 (𝑆) must satisfy, for
any subset 𝑇 ∈ 𝒫 (𝑆),
∑
𝑖∈𝑇
𝑟 𝑐𝑖 (𝑆) ≤ 𝑣(𝑆) − 𝑣(𝑆 ⧵ 𝑇 ). (11)
Proof. In each state 𝑆, the consumer chooses to buy from all firms in 𝑆 only if, for any subset
𝐵 ∈ 𝒫 (𝑆),
𝑣(𝑆) −∑
𝑖∈𝑆
𝑟 𝑐𝑖 (𝑆) ≥ 𝑣(𝐵) −∑
𝑖∈𝐵
𝑟 𝑐𝑖 (𝑆). (12)
9 This condition rules out equilibria with coordination failure, in which firmswith complementary technologies
both choose too high prices. Alternatively, Lerner and Tirole (2015) impose that the competitive prices of
technologies not bought by the implementer must be zero.
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Suppose there exists a subset 𝑇 ⊆ 𝑆 such that ∑𝑖∈𝑇 𝑟
𝑐
𝑖 (𝑆) > 𝑣(𝑆) − 𝑣(𝑆 ⧵ 𝑇 ), then
[𝑣(𝑆) −∑
𝑖∈𝑆
𝑟 𝑐𝑖 (𝑆)] − [𝑣(𝑆 ⧵ 𝑇 ) −∑
𝑖∈𝑆⧵𝑇
𝑟 𝑐𝑖 (𝑆)] = 𝑣(𝑆) − 𝑣(𝑆 ⧵ 𝑇 ) −∑
𝑖∈𝑇
𝑟 𝑐𝑖 (𝑆) < 0,
which means the buyer would prefer to buy only from firms in 𝑆 ⧵ 𝑇. Thus, inequality (12)
is true only if inequality (11) is true.
Inequality (11) defines the incremental value pricing rule, for each individual technology
as well as for a group of technologies in state 𝑆. For example, if a technology 𝑖 has a perfect
substitute in state 𝑆, then the incremental value of 𝑖, 𝑣(𝑆) − 𝑣(𝑆 ⧵ {𝑖}), is zero, which is its
competitive price according to Lemma 1.
The competitive benchmark is not necessarily unique within this model. Given the unit
demand, there are cases in which different price vectors can constitute the competitive
benchmark as defined. For example, consider 𝑣({1}) = 𝑣({2}) = 0 and 𝑣({1, 2}) = 𝑣. Then,
any prices such that 𝑟 𝑐1({1, 2})+𝑟 𝑐2({1, 2}) = 𝑣 satisfy the definition of competitive benchmark.
The results related to the competitive benchmark in this paper rely only on the necessary
condition (11).
Recall that the first-best efforts are induced if each firm is paid its individual incremental
value in all states. Since the competitive benchmark revenue in a certain state may be
smaller than the individual incremental value, while the reverse is never possible, the
competitive benchmark in such a case is not sufficient to induce the first-best efforts.
Given the following definition of complementarity, it can be shown that the competitive
benchmark is not first-best if some technologies are complementary.
Definition 1. Technologies 𝑖 and 𝑗 are complements if, for all 𝑆 ∈ 𝒫 (𝑁 ),
[𝑣(𝑆) − 𝑣(𝑆 ⧵ {𝑖})] + [𝑣(𝑆) − 𝑣(𝑆 ⧵ {𝑗})] ≥ 𝑣(𝑆) − 𝑣(𝑆 ⧵ {𝑖, 𝑗}) (13)
with strict inequality (>) for some 𝑆.
Proposition 2. If there exists a pair of technologies that are complements, then the first-best
research efforts cannot be implemented by a competitive benchmark.
Proof. The revenue scheme that induces the first-best efforts 𝑥∗ must satisfy
𝑥∗𝑖 ̄𝑟𝑖 = 𝑥∗𝑖
𝜕 ̄𝑣(𝑥∗)
𝜕 𝑥𝑖
for all 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁
= ∑
𝑆∈𝒫 (𝑁 )
Pr (𝑆 | 𝑥∗) [𝑣(𝑆) − 𝑣(𝑆 ⧵ {𝑖})].
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Suppose firms 𝑖 and 𝑗 are complements. From the competitive benchmark condition (11)
and the definition of complementarity (13), we have, for any state 𝑆,
𝑟 𝑐𝑖 (𝑆) + 𝑟
𝑐
𝑗 (𝑆) ≤ 𝑣(𝑆) − 𝑣(𝑆 ⧵ {𝑖, 𝑗})
≤ [𝑣(𝑆) − 𝑣(𝑆 ⧵ {𝑖})] + [𝑣(𝑆) − 𝑣(𝑆 ⧵ {𝑗})].
As inequality (13) is strict for some 𝑆 per definition, multiplying both sides by Pr (𝑆 | 𝑥∗)
and sum over all 𝑆 yields, with ̄𝑟 𝑐𝑖 defined analogous to (5),




Pr (𝑆 | 𝑥∗) ([𝑣(𝑆) − 𝑣(𝑆 ⧵ {𝑖})] + [𝑣(𝑆) − 𝑣(𝑆 ⧵ {𝑗})]) .
Thus, the competitive benchmark does not implement the first-best efforts.
The intuition of Proposition 2 is as follows. Since some technologies are complementary,
then we cannot reward each firm the whole individual incremental value 𝑣(𝑆) − 𝑣(𝑆 ⧵ {𝑖}).
This makes it impossible for the competitive benchmark to induce the first-best efforts.
However, even if the competitive benchmark cannot attain the first best, it may still
implements the second-best research efforts. The following proposition shows that this is
not necessarily the case. If the competitive benchmark is not on the boundary of the feasible
set, that is, there are values left on the table that we can give to firms, then increasing the
revenues over the competitive benchmark can improve welfare.
Proposition 3. If first-best efforts are not feasible and the expected revenue from a competitive
benchmark is interior in the feasible region defined by the constraint (7), then the benchmark
does not implement the second-best research efforts.
There exists a case in which welfare can be improved by allowing supra-competitive revenue.
Proof. From the assumption that there is a unique local and global maximum in [0, 1]𝑛,
if the first-best efforts are not in the feasible set, then there is no local maximum in the
interior of the feasible set. Since a maximum must exist in the compact feasible set, the
maximum (or maxima) must be located on the boundary of the set.
If the competitive benchmark corresponds to an interior point, it must not induce welfare-
maximising efforts in the feasible set, i.e. it does not implement the second-best research
efforts.







Pr (𝑆 || ?̂? 𝑐−𝑖) [𝑣(𝑆) − 𝑣(𝑆 ⧵ {𝑖})]
it follows that, given ?̂? 𝑐−𝑖,
𝜕 ̄𝑣(?̂? 𝑐)
𝜕 𝑥𝑖
≥ ̄𝑟 𝑐𝑖 = 𝑐(?̂?
𝑐
𝑖 ).
Since the competitive benchmark is interior and is not a local maximum, the inequality
must be strict for some 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁, which means the marginal welfare is increasing in some 𝑥𝑖 at
the benchmark.
With Proposition 2 and Proposition 3, we see that with complementary technologies, it is
possible that there is room to improve welfare without breaking the budget. This happens
if in some states the full value is not paid out in the competitive benchmark. The following
numerical example uses a set-up similar to Section 2, but instead of an exogenous free
substitute technology, there is another pair of complementary technologies that can be
chosen. The example shows that the competitive benchmark is interior in the feasible set
and induces welfare that is lower than the second best.
Example 2. Suppose 𝑛 = 4, and the value function is defined as follows:
𝑣(𝑆) = {
10 if {1, 2} ⊆ 𝑆 or {3, 4} ⊆ 𝑆
0 otherwise
The cost function is 𝑐(𝑥𝑖) = 𝑥2𝑖 /(1 − 𝑥𝑖).
Under this setting, the welfare 𝑤(𝑥) is given by




The first-best efforts that maximise 𝑤(𝑥) are 𝑥∗𝑖 = 0.545 for all 𝑖. However, they are not
feasible under the budget constraint (7). The effort level 𝑥∗𝑖 = 0.545 requires ̄𝑟𝑖 = 𝑐′(0.545) =
3.831; this means ∑𝑥∗𝑖 ̄𝑟𝑖 = 8.353 exceeds the budget ̄𝑣(𝑥∗) = 5.059.
The second-best efforts, maximising 𝑤(𝑥) under constraint (7), are 𝑥𝑖 = 0.411, which can
be induced by ̄𝑟𝑖 = 𝑐′(0.411) = 1.881. The second-best welfare is 𝑤(𝑥) = 1.945.
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The symmetric competitive benchmark in this case is
𝑟 𝑐1(𝑆) = {
5 if {1, 2} ⊆ 𝑆 and {3, 4} ⊈ 𝑆
0 otherwise
and analogously for other firms. The objective of firm 1 is to maximise the expected profit
max
𝑥1
5𝑥1𝑥2(1 − 𝑥3𝑥4) −
𝑥21
1 − 𝑥1
and the first-order condition is




The symmetric equilibrium given the competitive benchmark is 𝑥 𝑐𝑖 = 0.384 for all 𝑖. This
equilibrium is interior, as ̄𝑟𝑖 = 𝑐′(0.384) = 1.638 yields ∑𝑥𝑖 ̄𝑟𝑖 = 2.517, which is smaller than
̄𝑣(𝑥) = 2.735. The welfare induced by the equilibrium is 𝑤(𝑥 𝑐) = 1.776.
4.3 State-contingent budget constraints
In previous sections, the problem with constraint (7) is formulated in expected terms. If we
consider the revenues given to firms to be royalties from implementers, then this constraint
is too lax as it allows the principal to transfer values across different states. If the principal
is only allowed to distribute the available value within each state, the revenue scheme must
instead satisfy the state-based budget constraints
∑
𝑖∈𝑆
𝑟𝑖(𝑆) ≤ 𝑣(𝑆) for all 𝑆 ∈ 𝒫 (𝑁 ). (8)
These constraints are stronger than the previous constraint (7); a revenue scheme that
satisfies (8) also satisfies (7), but the reverse is not necessarily true.
With 2𝑛 budget constraints (8) formulated with 𝑟𝑖(𝑆), the problem becomes considerably
more complicated. The following results show that the result on the competitive benchmark
established in the previous section still applies in this case, namely if first-best efforts are not
feasible and the benchmark is interior in the feasible set defined by (8), then the benchmark
does not implement the second-best efforts under these constraints. The previous analysis
is based on choosing the expected revenues ̄𝑟 to maximise the surplus 𝑤(𝑥), subject to
constraint (7) on ̄𝑟. Lemma 2 restates the constraints (8) into a set of constraints on ̄𝑟. This
means the problem of choosing a revenue scheme that satisfies (8) can still be reduced to
16
that of choosing the expected revenues ̄𝑟 subject to the following set of constraints (14),
without specifying the (not necessarily unique) implementation of the revenue scheme.
Lemma 2. Given the chosen research efforts 𝑥 and expected revenues ̄𝑟, there exists a revenue
scheme that implements ̄𝑟 according to (5) and satisfies the constraints (8) for all states 𝑆, if
and only if ̄𝑟 satisfies, for all states 𝑆,
∑
𝑖∈𝑆
𝑥𝑖 ̄𝑟𝑖 ≤ ∑
𝑇∈𝒬(𝑆)
Pr (𝑇 | 𝑥) 𝑣(𝑇 ), (14)
where 𝒬(𝑆) = {𝑇 ∈ 𝒫 (𝑁 ) | 𝑆 ∩ 𝑇 ≠ ∅} is the set of states that has at least one of the firms in
set 𝑆.
Proof. First, I will show that a revenue scheme that represents ̄𝑟 and satisfies the state-
based budget constraints (8) exists only if ̄𝑟 satisfies (14). Consider a revenue scheme that
represents ̄𝑟 and satisfies (8). Using the definition of ̄𝑟𝑖 from (5),
∑
𝑖∈𝑆




Pr (𝑇 | 𝑥−𝑖) 𝑟𝑖(𝑇 )] .
Note that 𝑥𝑖 Pr (𝑇 | 𝑥−𝑖) = Pr (𝑇 | 𝑥) . Since it is imposed that 𝑟𝑖(𝑇 ) = 0 if 𝑖 ∉ 𝑇, summing
over all states equals summing over states that intersect with 𝑆. Thus,
∑
𝑖∈𝑆




Pr (𝑇 | 𝑥) 𝑟𝑖(𝑇 )
= ∑
𝑇∈𝒬(𝑆)
[Pr (𝑇 | 𝑥) ∑
𝑖∈𝑆
𝑟𝑖(𝑇 )] .
With 𝑟𝑖(𝑇 ) = 0 if 𝑖 ∉ 𝑇, it must be that ∑𝑖∈𝑆 𝑟𝑖(𝑇 ) ≤ ∑𝑖∈𝑇 𝑟𝑖(𝑇 ). If (8) holds, it follows that
∑
𝑖∈𝑆
𝑥𝑖 ̄𝑟𝑖 ≤ ∑
𝑇∈𝒬(𝑆)
Pr (𝑇 | 𝑥) 𝑣(𝑇 ).
Thus, we have that a scheme represents ̄𝑟 and satisfies (8) only if ̄𝑟 satisfies (14).
Now, I will show that the revenue scheme exists if ̄𝑟 satisfies (14). The existence of a
revenue scheme that represents ̄𝑟 according to (5) and satisfies (8) for all states means the
17







Pr (𝑆 | 𝑥) 𝑟𝑖(𝑆))
2
subject to (8) for all 𝑆
and 𝑟𝑖(𝑆) ≥ 0 for all 𝑖 and 𝑆
The following steps show that the constrained minimum is zero, that is a feasible revenue
scheme that represents ̄𝑟 exists, if ̄𝑟 satisfies (14).
Consider the Kuhn–Tucker necessary conditions
2 Pr (𝑆 | 𝑥) (𝑥𝑖 ̄𝑟𝑖 −∑
𝑆∈𝒫 (𝑁 )
Pr (𝑆 | 𝑥) 𝑟𝑖(𝑆)) + 𝜆𝑖𝑆 = 𝜇𝑆 for all 𝑖 and 𝑆
𝜇𝑆 (∑
𝑖∈𝑆
𝑟𝑖(𝑆) − 𝑣(𝑆)) = 0 for all 𝑆
𝜆𝑖𝑆𝑟𝑖(𝑆) = 0 for all 𝑖 and 𝑆
with the Kuhn–Tucker multipliers 𝜇𝑆 ≥ 0 for each constraint (8) and 𝜆𝑖𝑆 ≥ 0 for the
non-negativity constraint of each 𝑟𝑖(𝑆).
I will show by contradiction that if the constrained minimum is not zero then condi-
tion (14) is violated, thus the minimum is zero if ̄𝑟 satisfies (14). Suppose the constrained
minimum is strictly greater than zero and is attained at {𝑟0𝑖 (𝑠)}. There are two possibil-
ities for each 𝑖: either 𝑥𝑖 ̄𝑟𝑖 < ∑𝑆 Pr (𝑆 | 𝑥) 𝑟
0
𝑖 (𝑆) or 𝑥𝑖 ̄𝑟𝑖 > ∑𝑆 Pr (𝑆 | 𝑥) 𝑟
0
𝑖 (𝑆). The case of
𝑥𝑖 ̄𝑟𝑖 < ∑𝑆 Pr (𝑆 | 𝑥) 𝑟
0
𝑖 (𝑆) for any 𝑖 can be ruled out since the right-hand side can always be
lowered to zero.
Consider the case 𝑥𝑖 ̄𝑟𝑖 > ∑𝑆 Pr (𝑆 | 𝑥) 𝑟
0
𝑖 (𝑆) for some 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁. Let 𝐴 be the set of every such 𝑖,
that is,
𝐴 = {𝑖 ∈ 𝑁
||||
𝑥𝑖 ̄𝑟𝑖 > ∑
𝑆∈𝒫 (𝑁 )
Pr (𝑆 | 𝑥) 𝑟0𝑖 (𝑆)}.
From the necessary conditions, we have 𝜇𝑇 > 0 for every state 𝑇 such that 𝑇 ∩ 𝐴 ≠ ∅,
the constraint (8) for 𝑇 binds, and 𝑟0𝑖 (𝑇 ) = 0 for every 𝑖 ∉ 𝐴 (since 𝜆𝑖𝑇 > 0). Summing
∑𝑆 Pr (𝑆 | 𝑥) 𝑟
0
𝑗 (𝑆) over 𝑗 ∈ 𝐴 then gives
∑
𝑆∈𝒫 (𝑁 )
Pr (𝑆 | 𝑥) ∑
𝑗∈𝐴
𝑟0𝑗 (𝑆) = ∑
𝑇∈𝒬(𝐴)
Pr (𝑇 | 𝑥) 𝑣(𝑇 )
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and together with 𝑥𝑗 ̄𝑟𝑗 > ∑𝑆 Pr (𝑆 | 𝑥) 𝑟
0
𝑗 (𝑆) we have
∑
𝑗∈𝐴
𝑥𝑗 ̄𝑟𝑗 > ∑
𝑇∈𝒬(𝐴)
Pr (𝑇 | 𝑥) 𝑣(𝑇 )
which contradicts condition (14). Therefore, if ̄𝑟 satisfies (14), the minimum must be zero,
which means there exists a feasible revenue scheme that represents ̄𝑟.
Condition (14) says that for an arbitrary subset 𝑆 of firms, the sum of the expected
revenues ̄𝑟𝑖 given to them must not exceed the portion of the expected value ̄𝑣(𝑥) that comes
from states in which at least one firm from 𝑆 is present. When the values of 𝑥 and ̄𝑟 satisfy
the whole stack of such conditions, it is possible to find a revenue scheme that requires no
transfers across different states, as prescribed by (8).
With constraints defined by expected revenues, the problem is now in a form similar to the
problem considered in previous sections. A principal chooses expected revenues ̄𝑟, subject
to the constraints (14), to maximise the surplus 𝑤(𝑥) given the investment equilibrium (6).
Proposition 3 still directly applies in this case, with the constraint (7) replaced by the set
of constraints (14); the expected surplus from the competitive benchmark is not optimal,
neither in the first-best nor second-best senses, if some technologies are complementary
and the benchmark research efforts are interior in the feasible set defined by (14). The proof
of Proposition 3 applies to a compact feasible set, it holds for the feasible set defined by
these budget constraints.
While the result on the interiority survives, with more restrictive constraints the feasible
set under (14) is smaller than one under (7). It remains a question whether a competitive
benchmark that is interior under constraint (7) remains interior under (14). The following
lemma shows that a competitive benchmark that is interior in the feasible set defined by (7)
is also interior in the feasible set defined by (14).
Lemma 3. Given 𝑥 such that 𝑥𝑖 > 0 for all 𝑖, if the expected revenue from a competitive
benchmark is interior in the feasible region defined by the constraint (7), it is also interior in
the feasible region defined by the constraints (14).
Proof. Note that 𝑥𝑖 > 0 for all 𝑖 means Pr (𝑆 | 𝑥) > 0 for all 𝑆 ∈ 𝒫 (𝑁 ).
Consider a competitive benchmark 𝑟 𝑐𝑖 (𝑆) that is interior in the feasible region defined
by (7). The following steps show by contradiction that the expected revenues from a
competitive benchmark cannot be interior in the feasible region of (7) but not interior in
the feasible region of (14).
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Pr (𝑇 | 𝑥) 𝑟 𝑐𝑖 (𝑇 ) < ∑
𝑇∈𝒫 (𝑁 )
Pr (𝑇 | 𝑥) 𝑣(𝑇 ), (15)
while not being interior in (14) means, given that the competitive benchmark satisfies (11),





Pr (𝑇 | 𝑥) 𝑟 𝑐𝑖 (𝑇 ) = ∑
𝑇∈𝒬(𝑆)
Pr (𝑇 | 𝑥) 𝑣(𝑇 ). (16)







Pr (𝑇 | 𝑥) 𝑟 𝑐𝑗 (𝑇 ) < ∑
𝑇∈𝒫 (𝑁 )
𝑇∉𝒬(𝑆)
Pr (𝑇 | 𝑥) 𝑣(𝑇 ).
This is true only if there exists a state 𝑌 ∈ 𝒫 (𝑁 ) ⧵ 𝒬(𝑆) such that
∑
𝑖∈𝑌
𝑟 𝑐𝑖 (𝑌 ) < 𝑣(𝑌 ),
which in turn can only be true if 𝑣(𝑌 ) > 0.
From Lemma 1, the competitive benchmark must satisfy ∑𝑖∈𝑆 𝑟
𝑐
𝑖 (𝑆) ≤ 𝑣(𝑆) for all 𝑆. With
𝑟 𝑐𝑖 (𝑇 ) = 0 if 𝑖 ∉ 𝑇, equation (16) is true only if
∑
𝑖∈𝑆
𝑟 𝑐𝑖 (𝑇 ) = 𝑣(𝑇 ) for all 𝑇 ∈ 𝒬(𝑆). (17)
That is, only firms in set 𝑆 can receive a positive revenue in any states in the set 𝒬(𝑆) and
the value in those states are fully distributed.
Now, consider any state 𝑌 ′ such that 𝑌 ⊆ 𝑌 ′ and 𝑌 ′ ∩ 𝑆 ≠ ∅. From Lemma 1, the
competitive benchmark satisfies, given that 𝑣(𝑌 ) > 0,
∑
𝑖∈𝑌 ′⧵𝑌
𝑟 𝑐𝑖 (𝑌 ′) ≤ 𝑣(𝑌 ′) − 𝑣(𝑌 )
< 𝑣(𝑌 ′).
But since 𝑌 ′ ∈ 𝒬(𝑆) by definition, this contradicts (17). Therefore, it is not possible that the
expected revenue from a competitive benchmark is interior under (7), but not under (14).
The idea of the proof is that for a constraint (14) to be binding for a set of firms 𝑆, the
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Table 1: The values of each side in inequality (14) at the second-best efforts 𝑥𝑖 = 0.411 from Example 3.
𝑆 ∑ 𝑥𝑖 ̄𝑟𝑖 ∑ Pr (𝑇 | 𝑥) 𝑣(𝑇 )
{1} 0.773 2.096
{1, 2} 1.545 2.505
{1, 3} 1.545 3.091
{1, 2, 3} 2.318 3.091
𝑁 3.091 3.091
values in all states that contain at least one firm in 𝑆 must be fully paid only to the firms
in set 𝑆. However, some of the states also include firms outside of set 𝑆 that have positive
values by themselves. Since the revenues in the competitive benchmark is limited by (joint)
incremental values, it cannot be the case that the full values in those states are rewarded to
only the firms in set 𝑆.
Lemma 3 means that while the extra state-based budget constraints considered in this
section potentially reduce the feasible set, they do not affect the main results on the
competitive benchmark described in Proposition 2 and Proposition 3. It is possible that,
with complementary technologies, the competitive benchmark does not lead to the welfare-
maximising research efforts under the condition that the incentives given to the firms can
only be from the values created by the available technologies in a particular state.
The following example revisits Example 2 and shows that the competitive benchmark is
still interior in the feasible set defined in this section and gives an example of a revenue
scheme that satisfies the state-contingent constraints (8).
Example 3. Consider again the four-firm model described in Example 2, with the value
function
𝑣(𝑆) = {
10 if {1, 2} ⊆ 𝑆 or {3, 4} ⊆ 𝑆
0 otherwise
and the cost function 𝑐(𝑥𝑖) = 𝑥2𝑖 /(1 − 𝑥𝑖).
The second-best efforts 𝑥𝑖 = 0.411 under the budget constraint in expected terms (7),
described in Example 2, are also the solution to the constrained maximisation problem with
the constraints (14). Table 1 shows that at 𝑥𝑖 = 0.411, the constraints (14) are not binding
except for the full set 𝑁. Therefore, the competitive benchmark, described in Example 2 is
still interior in the feasible set.
One possible revenue scheme that implements the second-best efforts and satisfies the
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5 if {1, 2} ⊆ 𝑆 and {3, 4} ⊈ 𝑆
2.5 if 𝑆 = 𝑁
0 otherwise
and analogously for other firms. Compared to the competitive benchmark, this scheme
allows positive revenues to the firms when all technologies are invented, even though the
firms’ incremental contributions in that state is zero. Under this scheme, the expected
profit for firm 1 is
5𝑥1𝑥2(1 − 𝑥3𝑥4) + 2.5𝑥1𝑥2𝑥3𝑥4 −
𝑥21
1 − 𝑥1
and the equilibrium efforts are ?̂?𝑖 = 0.411 for all 𝑖, which are the second-best efforts.
5 Concluding remarks
In this paper, I analyse innovation incentives in the context of standardisation. The model
introduces the research stage for multiple interacting inventions that precedes the stand-
ardisation process. It allows us to study how the value jointly created by the inventions
should optimally be appropriated by their inventors and how the competitive outcome,
as commonly defined, performs compared to the optimal rule. It shows that allowing
supra-competitive royalties for innovators may enhance economic welfare. Specifically, it
increases welfare by allowing innovators to reap more benefits when there are competing
substitutes that drive the royalties down in order to compensate the suboptimal incent-
ives that arise from complementarities. This result provides a caveat to the idea that the
pre-standardisation competitive outcome optimally aligns incentives with contributions.
The effects illustrated in this paper should be interpreted as one of many relevant factors
that affect the optimal innovation incentives. As technologies are assumed to generate
fixed welfare that is not affected by royalties, the model isolates the problem of insufficient
incentives for complementary technologies from the multiple marginalisation problem in
licensing (also known as royalty stacking), whereby the cumulative royalties demanded
by multiple patent holders exceed even the monopoly price (Shapiro 2001). Other known
economic phenomena may counteract the effects illustrated in this paper. For example, a
patent race in which multiple firms pursue the same technology can lead to over-investment
in research (Tandon 1983).
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